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Abstract
In the course of railway reforms at the end of the last century, European na-
tional governments, as well the EU Commission, decided to open markets and to
separate railway networks from train operations. Vertically integrated railway com-
panies argue that such a separation of infrastructure and operations would diminish
the advantages of vertical integration and would therefore not be suitable to raise
economic welfare. In this paper, we conduct a pan-European analysis to investi-
gate the performance of European railways with a particular focus on economies of
scope associated with vertical integration. We test the hypothesis that integrated
railways realize economies of joint production and, thus, produce railway services
on a higher level of e±ciency. To determine whether joint or separate production is
more e±cient we apply an innovative Data Envelopment Analysis super-e±ciency
bootstrapping model which relates the e±ciency for integrated production to a vir-
tual reference set consisting of the separated production technology and which is
applicable to other network industries as energy and telecommunication as well.
Our ¯ndings are that for a majority of European Railway companies economies of
scope exist.
Keywords: E±ciency, Vertical Integration, Railway Industry
JEL-Classi¯cation: L22, L43, L92
1 Introduction
In the late eighties and early nineties of the last century, European national governments
as well the EU Commission decided to introduce competitive elements into the European
railway industries. The railway sector had been seen as performing poorly due to high
subsidy requirements and an increasingly falling market share compared to other modes
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1of transportation. The predominant means of restructuring the industry had been the
opening of markets and the separation of infrastructure from operations (Nash and Rivera-
Trujillo, 2004). However, in many European countries vertically integrated ¯rms own the
railway infrastructure and participate in the transport segment, still. Although they are
obliged to grant infrastructure access to third parties and to organizationally separate
the infrastructure and transportation business, there is nonetheless a potential for market
foreclosure and third party discrimination. An expanded institutional unbundling in the
means of complete ownership separation could eliminate this problem. Some European
countries, like the United Kingdom and Sweden, already implemented new institutional
arrangements: in these countries a state-controlled ¯rm owns the infrastructure and pro-
vides network access and services to numerous competitive transportation ¯rms. In other
countries, such as Germany or Austria, the railway sector is still dominated by integrated
incumbents. These ¯rms argue that an institutional separation would diminish the advan-
tages of vertical integration and would therefore not be suitable to raise economic welfare.
Such economies of scope could result either from technical advantages or transactional
advantages of joint production. If these would be in existence then an integrated market
structure would be e±cient; if not, a separation with competition in transport operations
would be advantageous.
Following this argumentation a decision in favor or against institutional separation ne-
cessitates an analysis concerning potential economies of scope within the railway sector.
Previous research (for instance Bitzan, 2003; Ivaldi and McCullough, 2004) addressed this
issue without actually comparing di®erent production technologies and was based on a
single country level only. In this paper, we conduct a cross-country analysis to investi-
gate the performance of European railways with particular focus on economies of scope.
Our unique dataset consists of about 50 railway companies from 27 European countries,
observed over a period of ¯ve years from 2000 to 2004. The companies represent a variety
of di®erent ¯rm sizes, input-output combinations and, most importantly, di®erent insti-
tutional settings, namely vertically integrated railways and unbundled network and train
operators. To test the hypothesis that integrated railways { companies owning a network
and providing transport services { realize economies of scope, we analyze if integrated
companies are relatively more technically e±cient compared to unbundled railways by
applying a distance function model. In contrast to previous research, this allows us to
refrain from determining the ¯rms' maximization concern, which is crucial for a sample of
regulated companies.1Additionally, distance functions do not require information on in-
and output prices and thus facilitate international comparisons distinctly. Our analysis
adopts a two step approach, which is innovative in its application not just for the rail-
way sector, but for network industries in general. In the ¯rst step we estimate technical
e±ciency of integrated and non-integrated railways using the non-parametric data envel-
opment analysis (DEA), allowing us to avoid any speci¯c assumption of the underlying
technology's functional form. In order to make a set of non-integrated railways compa-
1 For discussion of distance functions in favor of cost or revenue functions, see Coelli and Perelman
(2000) and section three of this paper.
2rable to the integrated railways we follow a suggestion by Morita (2002) and construct
virtually integrated ¯rms from samples of di®erent specialized ¯rms. Subsequently, in the
second step, we determine whether joint or separate production is more e±cient. There-
fore, we apply a DEA super-e±ciency model, which relates the e±ciency for the integrated
production to a reference set consisting of the separate production technology. The major
methodological advantage of this procedure is that it enables us to compare two di®erent
production technologies rather than analyzing one production frontier derived from all
¯rms, as done in most previous research. However, the method provides rather general
empirical tendencies than a precise quanti¯cation of economies of scope. Nevertheless, an
application on the railway industry as well on other network sectors such as electricity, gas
and telecommunication supports understanding industry structure and possible e®ects of
governmental policies.
This paper aims to ¯ll the void in previous research and empirically analyzes the
question of whether economies of scope in railways exist or not. The outline for the
remainder of this paper is as follows. The theoretical foundations and previous literature
are presented in section 2. Section 3 discusses methodology. In section 4 we introduce the
modeling approach and describe the data. Estimation results are presented in section 5.
Section 6 contains conclusions and highlights policy implications and directions for future
research
2 Economies of scope in railways { theoretical back-
ground and previous research
The main argument against vertical and horizontal separation (or the unbundling of ser-
vices respectively) in the railway industry has been the potential existence of signi¯cant
economies of scope. However, empirical evidence for scope economies in railways is scarce.
This section provides a theoretical overview on the conditions of economies of scope and
their possible sources in railway industries. We then review previous research on e±-
ciency and scope economies in railways and present the ability of non-parametric frontier
techniques measuring economies of scope.
Economies of scope arise, in general, when cost savings can be realized due to a
joint production of goods. Hence, it is more e±cient to produce a certain output vector
by a single ¯rm than separately in two or more ¯rms. Technically, economies of scope
occur when the costs of producing a speci¯c output vector Y jointly are lower than the
costs of producing the same output vector separately under the restriction of orthogonal
nonnegative output vectors (Yi) (Baumol et al., 1988):
C (Y ) <
m X
i=1




Diseconomies of scope occur when that inequality is reversed. For the case of railway
3production, the output vector may be divided into infrastructure management (YI), pas-
senger transportation (YP) and freight transportation (YF). Economies of scope exist
when the inequality
C (YI;YP;YF) < C (YI;0;0) + C (0;YP;0) + C (0;0;YF) (2)
holds: the separate production of outputs comes at higher cost than joint production.
If this applies to railway production an integrated market solution with only one ¯rm is
favorable to a separated institutional arrangement, where the infrastructure manager is
institutionally separated from passenger and freight operators.
The main argument in favor of economies of scope in the railway industry is that
of potential transaction costs savings within an integrated organization: Railway ser-
vices are characterized by a high level of technological and transactional interdependence
between infrastructure and operations. This includes long-term capacity allocation, secu-
rity management, timetable coordination and investment planning as well as every day
operational decisions on tra±c coordination like train length, train speed or emergency
service. Technologically, all these activities can be organized within a hierarchical (inte-
grated) structure as well as within a contractual market structure among separated ¯rms.
Depending on the amount of transaction costs either one has to be preferred. 2
Supporters of an integrated structure argue for an increase in costs in a separated
structure as with a rise in the numbers of operators the number of contract negotiations
as well as technical and organizational interfaces will rise. While for real-time tra±c
coordination this argument does most likely not hold it may be a consideration in e±cient
long term allocation: real time tra±c coordination costs do not depend on the number of
operators on the network but on the number of the train movements. As long as only one
network ¯rm { either integrated or separated { is responsible for this production stage no
signi¯cant transaction cost di®erences should be expected (Knieps, 2004). In opposition
to this, identifying the e±cient institutional arrangement for long-term capacity allocation
is rather sophisticated. Especially long-term investment decisions may di®er among one
integrated and several separated ¯rms: Railway operations highly depend on the exact
coordination between the infrastructure and operations section. Every decision on rolling
stock or wheel design a®ects the track design and track maintenance requirements and
the other way around (Pittman, 2005). For example, a passenger operator investing in
high speed trains has to be sure that the track system is capable to provide high speed
transportation. On the other hand, the infrastructure provider has to know what kind
of capacity at what time and at what place is needed. Such coordination is information
intensive. Whether this interaction can be provided at lower transaction costs within
an integrated or separated structure cannot be identi¯ed easily. On a ¯rst glance, the
number of participating ¯rms in a separated system gives reason to assume the integrated
system being favorable. However, the °ow of information in a widely branched ¯rm also
2 For a detailed description of transaction costs theory see Williamson (1975; 1985).
4bears huge risks of increasing information and hence transaction costs.
In relation to this another problem of long-term capacity allocation arises due to
di®erent investment incentives within the two possible institutional arrangements. For
example, an integrated infrastructure provider and transport operator has an incentive to
invest in network infrastructure in order to prevent his rolling stock from wear and tear.
In a separated system, with other ¯rms owning the rolling stock, this incentive disappears
(Mulder et al., 2005). Analogous, a separated transport operator has no incentive to
invest into his rolling stock to reduce the wear and tear of the tracks only. Hence, within
a separated system the coordination of long term investment determines more (cost in-
tensive) interactions and negotiations between the production stages. However, within
an integrated organization the lack of competition and the direct monetary connection
between performance and counter-performance may result in an ine±cient { also cost
intensive { resource allocation. The question of which e®ect is being dominant remains
hard to answer. Recapitulating, the discussion above shows how complex the interde-
pendencies between infrastructure and operations are and hence how di±cult the task of
judging for or against economies of scope is. Thus, the optimal institutional arrangement
in the rail-way sector becomes an empirical question.
Studies with speci¯c focus on vertical separation and economies of scope are rather few.
In a paper from 2003 Bitzan uses a data set of 30 US Class I freight railways covering the
years 1983-97 to evaluate the cost implications of competition in the US rail freight indus-
try. The results obtained by estimating a translog quasi-cost function indicate economies
of vertical integration, suggesting that vertical separation leads to increased costs. How-
ever, considering di®erent technological characteristics in other countries Bitzan restricts
his ¯ndings to the US freight railway industry. Especially the European railway systems
with usually much smaller networks and a high passenger fraction within the combined
passenger and freight operations may lead to other cost implications of competition and/or
separation, as Bitzan states (Bitzan, 2003). Ivaldi and McCullough (2004) use a compara-
ble data set of 22 US Class I freight railways covering the years 1978-2001. They evaluate
the technological feasibility of separating vertically integrated ¯rms into an infrastructure
company and competing operating ¯rms. The results obtained by estimating a general-
ized McFadden cost function indicate vertical as well as horizontal economies of scope
in a technological sense. The authors state that vertical separation may lead to a 20-40
percent cost disadvantage over a vertically integrated system and to even greater disad-
vantages if bulk and general freight operations are separated likewise. Nevertheless, since
observing integrated ¯rms in the sample only, Ivaldi and McCullough restrict their ¯nd-
ings to pure technological e®ects of separation. Neither the e®ects of transaction costs, in
an integrated compared to a separated system, nor the e®ects of competition have been
assessed. Additionally, like Bitzan, they consider di®erent rail system characteristics in
other countries and hence restrict their ¯ndings to the US rail freight system.
Cantos-Sanchez (2001) estimates a translog cost function from a panel of 12 European
state-owned railways for the period 1973-90. His ¯ndings report cost substitutability
between track infrastructure and passenger operations but cost complementarity between
5track infrastructure and freight operations. That is, higher track costs lead to lower
passenger operation costs as well as higher freight operation costs. This result gives an
indication for diseconomies of scope between passenger and freight operations. However,
considering the risk that separated ¯rms do not account for these interdependencies, this
¯nding also gives reason to assume that there are bene¯ts of vertical integration, as Nash
and Rivera-Trujillo (2004) state.
A recent study on European railways by Friebel et al. (2004) investigates the impact of
policy reforms on 12 European national railway ¯rms. By applying a production frontier
model they compare passenger tra±c e±ciency for the period 1980-00, in which most of the
European railway markets were reformed. They ¯nd that the implementation of reforms
gradually improves e±ciency whereas multiple reforms implemented simultaneously only
have at best neutral e®ects. Controlling for the e®ect of separation Friebel et al. show that
there are no signi¯cant di®erences in e±ciency between fully integrated companies and
organizationally separated ¯rms, but that full institutional separation has a positive e®ect
on e±ciency. However, this analysis only holds when the United Kingdom is excluded
from the dataset. Furthermore, the results indicate that { in general { smaller railway
¯rms (¯rm size being measured in terms of network length) have improved e±ciency more
than ¯rms of larger size.
Overall, previous research on the economics of vertical integration in railways shows
that the impact of scope economies on the e±ciency of railway systems is still ambigu-
ous. Aside from that, several important issues, such as di®erent production technologies
in integrated and separated organizational arrangements and limitations due to speci¯c
behavioral assumptions, have not been addressed so far. Therefore, in order to estimate
scope economies in technological and especially transactional sense we apply data en-
velopment analysis (DEA). Our pan-European data set incorporates railway ¯rms from
27 European countries for the period 2000-04. In contrast to previous studies the data
includes not only integrated railway ¯rms, but separated ¯rms, di®erentiated between
infrastructure managers, passenger operators and freight operators. To our knowledge,
this is the ¯rst study using this kind of data in a European railway e±ciency comparison.
Furthermore, considering the estimation technique we compare two di®erent production
frontiers of separated and integrated ¯rms rather than analyzing one frontier derived from
all ¯rms, as done in most previous work. Thus we explicitly incorporate di®erent pro-
duction technologies. Several variations of this technique can be found in Ferrier et al.
(1993), Prior (1996), Fried et al. (1998), Prior and Sola (2000), Kittelsen and Magnussen
(2003) and Cummins et al. (2003), evaluating scope and diversi¯cation economies in the
banking, hospital, health care and insurance sector.
3 Methodology
To specify a multiple-output multiple-input production technology we apply the distance
function approach proposed by Shephard (1953; 1970). Compared to other representa-
6tions of technologies, such as cost or revenue functions, it requires no speci¯c behavioral
objectives such as cost minimization or pro¯t maximization, which are likely to be violated
in the case of partly state-owned and highly regulated industries as European railways
(Coelli and Perelman, 2000).
Distance functions can be di®erentiated into input-oriented and output-oriented dis-
tance functions. The input orientation assumes that the output set is determined by
exogenous factors and hence that the in°uence of ¯rms on output quantities is limited;
the output orientation assumes exactly the same for the input set. For railways, both ver-
sions can be appropriate. Supporting the input-orientated approach one could argue that
the demand for outputs is in°uenced highly by macro-economic factors (e.g. customer
density) as well as state-controlled public transport requirements. A major aspect in favor
of an output-oriented approach is the existence of hardly controllable input factors, for
example political in°uence on capital expenditures (Coelli and Perelman, 1999).3
Modeling a production technology as an input distance function4 one can investigate
how much the input vector can be proportionally reduced holding the output vector ¯xed.
Assuming that the technology satis¯es the standard properties listed in FÄ are and Primont
(1995) it can be de¯ned as:
DI (x;y) = maxfµ : (x=µ) 2 L(y)g; (3)
where the input set L(y) represents the set of all input vectors x that can produce the
output vector y. The function is non-decreasing, positively linearly homogeneous and
concave in x, and increasing in y (Lovell et al., 1994). From x 2 L(y) follows DI(x;y) ¸ 1.
A value equal to unity identi¯es the respective ¯rm as being fully e±cient and located on
the frontier of the input set. Values greater than unity belong to input sets within the
frontier indicating ine±cient ¯rms.
In order to estimate the distance functions and obtain information about technical
e±ciency and scope economies of European railways we use data envelopment analysis
(DEA), a method introduced by Charnes et al. (1978). DEA is a non-parametric ap-
proach which constructs a piece-wise linear production frontier enveloping all observed
data points. This production frontier can be estimated either under constant returns to
scale (CRS) or under variable returns to scale (VRS). The CRS approach assumes that the
observed ¯rms can alter their size and hence identi¯es ¯rms departing from optimal scale
as ine±cient. In contrast, the VRS approach compares ¯rms within similar scale, account-
ing for e±ciency variation based on scale di®erences. Although the VRS approach allows
an e±ciency comparison corrected for scale in°uences we follow the CRS approach: we
argue that an e±ciency comparison should consider the long-term perspective, including
increasing European deregulation and integration. Country-speci¯c regulation and polit-
3 When applying a constant return to scale estimation approach there is no need to decide on the
orientation, since the input-oriented distance measure equals the output-oriented distance measure in
reciprocal terms, anyhow.
4 The output-oriented model is de¯ned in a similar way (see for instance Coelli and Perelman, 1999).
7ical in°uence preventing scale optimization in the short-run will diminish in the long-run.
Hence, ¯rms departing from optimal scale should be identi¯ed as ine±cient. Further on,
under the VRS approach the number of comparable ¯rms within a speci¯c range of size
could be very low. In the extreme when no ¯rm of comparable size exists a VRS DEA ap-
proach identi¯es the benchmarked ¯rm always as 100 percent e±cient. Finally, from the
technical perspective the VRS assumption may lead to infeasibility of the super-e±ciency
model used in the second stage of our analysis.5 Nevertheless, for reasons of comparison
and consideration of the possible in°uence of scale e±ciency on our estimation results we
also calculate the VRS e±ciency scores in the ¯rst stage of our analysis.
Taking it as given that the ¯rms use K inputs and M outputs the CRS input-oriented
frontier is calculated by solving the following linear optimization program for each of N
¯rms:6
maxµ;
s.t. ¡yi + Y ¸ ¸ 0;
xi=µ ¡ X¸ ¸ 0;
¸ ¸ 0;
(4)
where X is the K £ N matrix of inputs and Y the M £ N matrix of outputs. The i-th
¯rm's input and output vectors are represented by xi and yi respectively. ¸ is a N £ 1
vector of constants and µ is the input distance measure. As de¯ned earlier in this section
this measure indicates a ¯rm's technical (in)e±ciency. 7
To analyze economies of scope in the railway sector we calculate so called super-
e±ciency scores in a second step. Super-e±ciency measures can be obtained by calculating
the e±ciency of one group of observations relative to a production technology de¯ned by
another, reference group of observations; i.e., we compare the e±ciency of integrated
railway ¯rms relative to the e±ciency frontier of non-integrated railway ¯rms. In order to
obtain a comparable set of non-integrated ¯rms we follow a suggestion from Morita (2002)
and construct virtually integrated ¯rms from samples of di®erent separated ¯rms: assume,
for example, that there are two kinds of products, A and B, which could be produced
separately in two ¯rms or jointly in one ¯rm. There are nA ¯rms producing only A, nB
¯rms producing only B and nAB ¯rms producing both A and B. These ¯rms can be
compared by combining the nA ¯rms with the nB ¯rms receiving a number of nA £ nB
virtual ¯rms. These virtual ¯rms use the same inputs to produce the same outputs as the
nAB ¯rms, but producing them under an alternative production technology.
For J integrated ¯rms and S non-integrated ¯rms, the input distance function for an
integrated ¯rm j relative to the non-integrated ¯rms' frontier can be de¯ned as:
5 For a discussion of infeasibility of super-e±ciency models under VRS see for instance Zhu (2003).
6 In order to calculate the input-oriented frontier under VRS the convexity constraint N1' = 1 has to
be added.
7 Note that this is the Shepard measure of technical e±ciency. The corresponding Farrell measure can
be obtained by taking the reciprocal of the Shepard distance function (see for instance Wilson, 2005).
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µ : (xj=µ) 2 L
S (yj)
ª
; j = 1;2;:::;J (5)
where LS (yj) represents the set of all input vectors x of the non-integrated ¯rms that can
produce the output vector yj. In contrast to a company's input distance function value
calculated within its own group (which is greater or equal to unity), the relative e±ciency
value calculated to a reference set of the other companies' group can take values between
zero and in¯nity.
The corresponding CRS super e±ciency model is calculated by solving the following
linear optimization program J times for each of the integrated ¯rms:
maxµj;
s.t. ¡yj + Ys¸s ¸ 0; j = 1;2;:::;J
xj=µj ¡ Xs¸s ¸ 0; s = 1;2;:::;S
¸s ¸ 0;
(6)
where Xs is the K£N input matrix and Ys the M£N output matrix of all non-integrated
¯rms; xj is the input vector and yj the output vector of the evaluated integrated ¯rm,
and ¸s is a N £1 vector of constants of the separated ¯rms. If the input distance function
value, i.e. the super e±ciency score, for the evaluated ¯rm µj is lower than unity the
integrated ¯rm is dominant to (more e±cient than) the non-integrated frontier, whereas
a value greater than unity indicates a dominance of the non-integrated ¯rms` frontier to
the evaluated ¯rm. However, if for the integrated ¯rm the input distance function value
relative to its own group µ is also greater than unity, the ¯rm is dominated by its own
group's frontier also. Hence, considering the super e±ciency scores only is not su±cient
to identify the favorable technology or the existence of economies (diseconomies) of scope.
Consequently, as suggested by Cummins et al. (2003) we measure the distance between
the two production frontiers by calculating the ratio of the e±ciency and super e±ciency
scores.
To illustrate this one can consider non-integrated and integrated ¯rms producing a
single output with two inputs. The two input production frontiers are shown in ¯gure 1
where the production frontier for the integrated ¯rms is labelled Lj(y), and the production
frontier for non-integrated ¯rms is labelled Ls(y). 8 Firms being fully e±cient operate on
their respective frontier and hence show distance function (e±ciency) values relative to
their own group equalling unity. Economies (diseconomies) of scope, for all observations,
can be identi¯ed if the production frontiers do not intersect and the integrated (non-
integrated) frontier places closer to the origin. If the two production frontiers exhibit
an intersection point as shown in ¯gure 1, economies of scope for some observations and
diseconomies of scope for other observations can be identi¯ed.
For example, assume an integrated ¯rm operating at point A in ¯gure 1. The distance
8 Figure 1 and its description follow Cummins et al. (2003).











function value relative to the integrated frontier is µ = 0A=0D > 1 and the distance
function value relative to the separated frontier, which is µj = 0A=0B > 1 indicate this
¯rm being dominated by its own and the other group's frontier. In order to measure
which frontier places closer to the origin and hence to test if economies or diseconomies











Since the distance function value of point A relative to the integrated frontier is greater
than its e±ciency score, calculated with respect to the separated frontier, the ratio from
formula 7 is greater than unity, indicating the integrated ('own') frontier places closer
to the origin. Hence, for this ¯rm, economies of scope can be identi¯ed. The opposite
case { diseconomies of scope { can be shown for an integrated ¯rm operating at point
E. While both distance function values { relative to its own frontier µ = 0E=0F and
relative to the other group's frontier µj = 0E=0G { are greater than unity again, the
ratio µ=µj = 0G=0F is smaller than unity, since the separated frontier places closer to
the origin than the integrated frontier. In summary, if the ratio is greater (lower) than
unity a ¯rm's own frontier dominates (is dominated by) the other group's frontier for the
observed production point. Hence, for integrated ¯rms a ratio greater than unity indicates
econo-mies of scope and a ratio lower than unity indicates diseconomies of scope.
Since DEA e±ciency measures are only point estimators calculated within a ¯nite
10sample, they are highly sensitive to sampling variations and errors in the data, and lack
common statistical properties. In order to overcome this shortcoming, we apply a boot-
strap procedure. Bootstrapping, introduced by Efron (1979), is based on the idea that
when the original observed sample mimics the underlying population, every random draw
from this sample with replacement can be treated as a sample from the underlying popu-
lation itself. It is used when the original sampling distribution of the estimator of interest,
e.g. of the e±ciency measures, is unknown. In general, the bootstrap of our e±ciency
estimates can be described as follows: We ¯rst compute the e±ciency measure ^ µi for each
¯rm by DEA from the observed sample. After that, we generate a b-th (b = 1;2;:::;B)
bootstrap sample µ¤
b of size n with replacement from ^ µi, i = 1;:::;n, and calculate the
bootstrap estimate ^ µ¤
b by using DEA. This procedure is repeated B times to obtain a set of
estimates ^ µ¤
b, b = 1;2:::;B. Based on this sampling distribution the statistical properties
of the estimated e±ciency measures can be inferred.9
One major drawback of the outlined procedure is that it assumes a continuous true dis-
tribution F. However, especially in small samples with a large number of units identi¯ed
as being fully e±cient, the empirical distribution ^ F of the e±ciency scores is discontinuous
with a positive probability mass at µ = 1. Hence ^ F provides an inconsistent estimator of
F (Cummins et al., 2003). This problem can be solved with a smoothed bootstrap pro-
cedure, developed and extended by Simar and Wilson (1998; 2000), where the empirical
distribution ^ F is smoothed using a Gaussian kernel density estimator. In our analysis we
use this bootstrap procedure to estimate the bias and variance of the DEA e±ciency esti-
mates, and to construct con¯dence intervals. As recommended by Hall (1986) we choose
B=1000 bootstrap replications. 10
4 Modeling approach and data description
The data set consists of 54 railway ¯rms from 27 European countries throughout the period
2000-2004. Considering every year as an independent observation we receive a sample
of 152 observations in total.11 The data was mainly taken from the railway statistics
published by the Union Internationale des Chemins de Fer (2004; 2005) and combined
with information from the companies' annual reports and companies' statistics.
The ¯rms are divided into four di®erent groups: Integrated ¯rms (IF), infrastructure
managers (IM), passenger operators (PO) and freight operators (FO). Every group sells
a di®erent type of product, with the integrated ¯rms o®ering all activities from a single
source. The essential activity in railway operations is the infrastructure management
9 For more details on the bootstrap see for instance Efron (1979) or Efron and Tibshirani (1993).
10 For details of the procedure, please refer to Simar and Wilson (1998; 2000).
11 The di®erence between 270 observations having full data coverage and the lower value of de facto
152 observations results from market entries later than 2000 and missing data mainly of 2004. Assuming
every year as an independent observation includes e®ects of technical progress and catching-up in the
e±ciency scores. However, long asset live in relation to the rather short observed time period of ¯ve years
suggests these e®ects as negligible (A®uso et al., 2002).
11which forms an indispensable requirement for transportation services. It is o®ered ei-
ther by an infrastructure manager or an integrated ¯rm and includes maintaining tracks,
railway stations or signal facilities as well as schedule-monitoring and system-control.
The infrastructure manager coordinates train movements, provides emergency service for
defective transport devices and develops time tables. Recapitulating the infrastructure
manager's tasks, he provides and sells network access and services to the transportation
¯rms, subject to the condition of optimal capacity utilization. We therefore use the vari-
able train-km driven on the network as an output measure for infrastructure managers.12
The second activity in railway operations is transportation, which can be distinguished be-
tween passenger and freight transportation. It is provided by passenger operators, freight
operators or integrated ¯rms. Since { for passenger operators { revenues depend on the
number of passengers and the distance traveled, we use the variable passenger-km as an
output measure. The freight operators' revenues depend on the amount and distance of
tonnes transported. Hence, the corresponding output variable freight tonne-km is used.
Considering the input variables we specify two di®erent models. While the ¯rst model
(Model I) is based on physical measures for the input factors only, the second model
(Model II) also takes a monetary ¯gure into account. In the ¯rst model, number of
employees, number of rolling stock and network length are used as physical measures
for labor and capital input. In the second model, the 'physical' variables number of
employees and number of rolling stock are substituted by the monetary variable operating
expenditure (OPEX). The variable represents the total operating expenses, including the
costs of sta®, materials, external charges, taxes, depreciation, value adjustments and
provisions for contingencies. Although this variable already includes capital costs we still
use the variable network length as a proxy for capital stock. We consider network length {
as a long life asset { as a quasi-¯xed input mainly built in the past and ¯nanced by capital
grants from the government. 13 Furthermore it re°ects the cost impact of di®erences in
network structure and density (Smith, 2006).
Both models have advantages and disadvantages. The usage of physical measures for
international comparison neglects the di®erences in relative factor prices among the coun-
tries; on the other hand, using monetary values raises the problem of di®erences in price
levels, accounting rules and currency conversion. To limit this problem we follow Jamasb
and Pollitt (2003) by converting the ¯nancial data of operating costs into one monetary
unit, the Euro. By applying purchasing power parities provided by Eurostat (2005) in-
stead of conventional exchange rates, we account not only for currency conversion but also
for di®erences in price levels and purchasing power among the countries. Nevertheless,
the problem of varying accounting standards among the countries remains. We estimate
12 The data on train-kms driven on the network was published ¯rst for the year 2003 by the Union
Internationale des Chemins de Fer (UIC). If available the data for preceding years was taken from the
annual reports. If not available the train-km values of the biggest passenger and freight operators in the
speci¯c country where taken to approximate the value.
13 This approach has been used quite frequently in previous literature, see Cantos et al. (2002) for a
short review.
12both models and check for di®erences by comparing the results therefore.
Table 1 shows the ¯rms sorted after their type of activity and the selected variables.
While for integrated ¯rms all described input and output variables are part of their corre-
sponding production technology, the variable set for the non-integrated ¯rms { passenger
operators, freight operators and infrastructure managers { di®er by their type of activity.
In order to estimate economies of scope we use the parameter values of non-integrated
¯rms to construct 'virtually' integrated ¯rms, which are comparable to the really inte-
grated ¯rms: every infrastructure manager is combined with every passenger and every
freight operator by accumulating their individual parameter values. A new group of 'vir-
tually' integrated ¯rms (VF) is generated, using a comparable production technology,
since those VF share the same inputs and produce the same outputs as the integrated
¯rms.
Table 1: Variables sorted by type of activity and model speci¯cation
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Tables 2 and 3 show the summary statistics of the data used in the each model,
classi¯ed for integrated and 'virtually' integrated ¯rms. The number of observations
of integrated ¯rms di®ers slightly between the estimated models { 75 observations for
Model I and 73 observations for Model II { due to missing data. The observations of
'virtually' integrated ¯rms in Model I are generated by combining 33 observations of
infrastructure managers with 16 observations of passenger operators and 11 observations
of freight operators. In total, we obtain a number of 5808 'virtually' integrated ¯rms for
this model. For Model II, 23 observations of infrastructure managers, 27 observations of
passenger operators and 8 observations of freight observations are combined to a total
number of 4968 'virtually' integrated ¯rms. Again, the di®erence in the numbers is due
to missing data. To eliminate extreme virtual input-output combinations, we adjust the
sub-sample of 'virtually' integrated ¯rms for outliers by applying the method suggested
by Hadi (1992; 1994), which identi¯es multiple outliers in multivariate data. For Model I,
2508 observations were dropped, leaving 3330 observations of 'virtually' integrated ¯rms.
Data for Model II is adjusted for 2160 outliers, leaving 2808 observations of 'virtually'
13integrated ¯rms in total.14
Table 2: Model I { Summary statistics
Integrated ¯rms 'Virtually' integrated ¯rms
Mean Max Min Mean Max Min
No. of employees 50517 249251 952 12870 36192 3465
No. of rolling stock 40351 219574 223 4981 11893 747
Network length (in km) 7331 36588 180 4665 9882 2047
Passenger-km (in millions) 11494 74459 126 4653 6621 2204
Tonne-km (in millions) 14258 76815 14 4952 13120 107
Train-km (in thousands) 134764 988200 2382 63158 128000 22667
No. of observations 75 3300
Table 3: Model II { Summary statistics
Integrated ¯rms 'Virtually' integrated ¯rms
Mean Max Min Mean Max Min
OPEX (in millions of ¿) 3281 29669 79 1439 3927 329
Network length (in km) 7474 36588 180 4055 5854 2273
Passenger-km (in millions) 11779 74459 126 4795 14666 7
Tonne-km (in millions) 14400 76815 14 5854 13120 456
Train-km (in thousands) 137999 988200 2382 45151 64341 36442
No. of observations 73 2808
5 Results
In this section, we present the results of the estimated models. First, we analyze the
technical e±ciency results obtained by the DEA bootstrap procedure. We then extend
the discussion to the evaluation of contingent economies of scope.
Analyzing the DEA bootstrap estimation results (Table 4), the following conclusions
can be drawn. For both models, the bias-corrected distance function values are greater
than the original e±ciency scores on average, indicating that a standard DEA approach
without a bootstrap procedure tends to overestimate e±ciency in our sample. For Model
14 This large number of outliers identi¯ed results from a high fraction of 'unrealistic' virtual in-
put/output combinations, combinations of very large infrastructure managers with small passenger op-
erators for instance.
14I (Model II) the average distance function value for the integrated ¯rms is corrected by
about 14 percent (6 percent) and the average e±ciency value for the 'virtually' integrated
¯rms by about 2 percent (1 percent), suggesting that bias-correction especially in small
{ data sensitive { samples is essential for correct e±ciency results.
Table 4: Summary statistics of original and bias-corrected distance func-
tion (e±ciency) results ¤








E±ciency 1.8378 2.0924 1.3786 1.4008
Standard deviation 0.7980 0.8837 0.3510 0.3552
Maximum e±ciency 3.9459 4.5140 2.5344 2.6080
Minimum e±ciency 1.0000 1.1597 1.0000 1.0024








E±ciency 1.3466 1.4324 1.5202 1.5401
Standard deviation 0.3975 0.4116 0.3878 0.3924
Maximum e±ciency 3.3012 3.4616 3.3123 3.4603
Minimum e±ciency 1.0000 1.0728 1.0000 1.0017
¤All estimations are made with FEAR: A package for frontier e±ciency analysis with R (Wilson, 2005).
For Model I, the estimated bias-corrected distance function value of 2.0924 for the
integrated ¯rms implies that, on average, the same output quantity could have been
produced despite of reducing the input usage by more than 52 percent. However, the
high standard deviation of 0.8837 shows that the mean distance function value includes
numerous extreme values. Comparing these results with Model II, where a monetary value
OPEX is used instead of the physical variables number of employees and number of rolling
stock shows a lower standard deviation (0.4115) as well as a much lower bias-corrected
distance function value (1.4324), indicating a possible input reduction of about 30 percent
on average. This suggests that the already addressed problem of physical measures -
neglecting di®erences in relative factor prices among countries - has an in°uence on our
15Model I estimation results. 15
Table 5 shows the bias-corrected distance function results for the integrated ¯rms
in Model I. Both distance values { in respect to their own frontier (2.0924) and to the
separated frontier (2.0961) { indicate a high level of ine±ciency, suggesting a possible re-
duction of 52 percent in inputs, on average, to reach either one of the e±ciency frontiers.
The average ratio of the distance function values slightly greater than unity (1.1109) sug-
gest that the two frontiers place very close to each other, and that, on average, economies
of scope can be assumed. However, since individually economies (diseconomies) of scope
may vary widely due to variation in the in- and output mix, a judgement on just the av-
erage parameter values could be misleading. Nevertheless, separating the ¯rms into two
groups { with an individual ratio of the distance function values greater unity indicating
economies of scope and below unity indicating diseconomies of scope { identi¯es scope
for 42 and diseconomies of scope for 33 observations. This equals to 56 percent and 44
percent of all observations, respectively.







Mean 2.0924 2.0961 1.1109 0.8404 1.3236
Standard deviation 0.8837 1.0954 0.3195 0.1614 0.2422
Maximum 4.5140 4.8501 1.8848 0.9994 1.8848
Minimum 1.1597 0.6804 0.3686 0.3686 1.0076
No. of observations
75 33 42
(100 percent) (44 percent) (56 percent)
For Model II (Table 6), the estimated distance function value in respect to the 'vir-
tually' integrated frontier (1.1932) indicates that, on average, an integrated ¯rm needs
an input reduction of about 16 percent to reach the e±ciency frontier of the 'virtually'
integrated ¯rms. Compared to Model I, the standard deviation is reduced by more than
50 percent, again indicating less extreme values in this model. The average distance func-
tions value ratio (1.4401) is greater than in Model I, implying increasing economies of
scope when considering OPEX instead of the physical measures number of employees and
rolling stock. Additionally, separating the sample into two groups - with regard to their
individual ratio of the distance function values being greater or below unity - suggests that
51 observations (70 percent) show economies of scope and 22 observations (30 percent)
15 To control for structural di®erences among the countries, we estimated a truncated regression and
regressed the e±ciency scores of the integrated companies upon GDP per capita, network density and
population density. For the results of Model I, we found a signi¯cant and positive but very little in°uence
of GDP per capita. For Model II, none of the variables had a signi¯cant in°uence on the e±ciency scores.
16diseconomies of scope. Hence, compared to Model I, a higher number of observations
show economies of scope. 16







Mean 1.4324 1.1932 1.4401 0.8514 1.6940
Standard deviation 0.4116 0.4810 0.8252 0.0916 0.8711
Maximum 3.4616 2.6297 4.0851 0.9963 4.0851
Minimum 1.0728 0.2781 0.6007 0.6007 1.0170
No. of observations
73 22 51
(100 percent) (30 percent) (70 percent)
6 Conclusions
Our analysis of a sample of 50 railway companies from 27 European countries observed
over a period of ¯ve years from 2000 to 2004 provides a ¯rst pan-European distance
function approach addressing economies of scope in railways, con¯rming previous ¯ndings
from the U.S. (. Bitzan, 2003; Ivaldi and McCullough, 2004) Within a model using physical
measures only, we ¯nd slight e±ciency advantages for integrated companies on average
and observe economies of scope for a majority of observations. Including monetary ¯gures,
more precisely operating expenses, produces even more explicit results: in a second model,
we show that integrated railway companies are on average relatively more e±cient than
'virtually' integrated companies, and ¯nd that a clear majority (70 percent) of the railway
companies observed indicate economies of scope.
Despite these results, the policy implications are ambiguous; indeed, economies of
scope exist for a majority of integrated European railway companies. Future sector re-
structuring should be aware of that issue and avoid increasing transaction costs unnec-
essarily. On the other hand, not disentangling the railway sector further retains discrim-
16 Scale di®erences among the integrated and 'virtually' integrated ¯rms and possible related di®erences
in returns to scale do not a®ect an upward-bias of our economies of scope estimations. We estimated
the returns to scale of the integrated ¯rms by using the scale e±ciency method (see for instance FÄ are
et al., 1994). Under the output-orientated approach, which conditions the scale properties on the input
vector, we found decreasing returns to scale { indicating a too large input-vector { on average and for
the majority of the ¯rms. Furthermore, considering scale ine±ciency due to decreasing returns to scale,
a signi¯cant and negative but very little coherence between scale ine±ciency and economies of scope can
be shown. Therefore, on average, a possible bias of the estimated scope economies of the integrated ¯rms
only applies as a downward-bias, a®ecting the economies of scope negatively, if at all.
17inatory incentives and complicates regulation. Policy makers should carefully outweigh
positive and negative aspects of vertical integration in railways.
Further research on economies of scope in the European railway industry should ad-
dress dynamic aspects of market liberalization and productivity development over time.
Especially a company's regulatory environment and its experience might have a signi¯cant
impact on relative e±ciency. Also, aspects of railway safety and quality of service need to
be incorporated in order to control for issues of particular importance, probably negatively
correlated with a company's level of cost.
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